Earth satellites:  A first look by the United States Navy by Hall, R. C.
ORIGINS 
Early In 1945 a special United States Naval Technical Mission in Europe 
accanpanied Allied forces advancing through the low countries into Germany. 
with Axis technical and scient i f ic  matters, organized into Ccnb ined  Advanced Field "&am 
canposed of both Brit ish and Am?rican scient is ts ,  the mission menhrs included the mthe- 
matician Anthony Biot, aerodynamicists C l a r k  Millikan and Hsue-shen Tsien, and p.ysicists 
Abraham matt and George Mid. 
German scient i f ic  p u p s  and installations of interest  t o  Allied agencies. 
Dornbenpr-von l3raun rocket gra\p who had surrendered t o  Allied troops a few days earlier 
1 at k u t t e  In the Tyrol. 
requested that von E3raun prepare a surrmary of German rocket developnents and his  predlc- 
tions for  the fiture of rocketry and astronautics.* The resulting report, Survey of 
Development of Liquid Rockets in Germany and Their nture Prospects, suggested potential 
app1icat:ons fo r  earth satellites, m e d  space stations,  and flights t o  neighboring 
celest ia l  bodies including the m n ,  as suggested earlier by Tsiolkovsky, Goddard, G L O r t h ,  
Noordung, and 0therS.j In July, that report accarpanied Abe watt when he returned t o  
the Navy Bureau of Aeronautics ( W r )  i n  Washington, D.C. According t o  Hyatt, it stirred 
a good deal of Interest amng individuals at BuAer, especially w n g  those i n  the Aviation 
Design Research Branch directed by Ivan H. Drigg~.~ But the individual f irst  and cer- 
t a i n l y  most moved by the subject of earth sa t e l l i t e s  at; mer was a young Navy lieutenant, 
Robert P. Haviland. 
Concerned 
These m n  conducted on-the-spot assessmnts of des-ted 
On May 5, 1945, a few of the mission nmbers interrogated the leaders of the 
hiring the meet- i n  the ~ m l l  town of Kochel, Bavaria, Tsien 
'Presented at the  Foruth History Symposium of the  International Academy of 
Astronautics, Constance, G e m  Federal Republic, October 1970. 
++Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Inst i tute  of Technology. 
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Haviland, &t,ttached to  the Electrorlics Materiel Branch of the Eslgirreering 
mvis,',m in the Navy wuleau of Aeronautics, examined Allied intelligence reprts and 
other documnts relating t o  aircraft identifiCatiOn and electronic countmmasrrres. 
a decrease i n  work ass-nts near war's end, Haviland turned his  attention t o  a favorite 
topic: the inglicatim of space rocketry.5 In the late suMner of 1945 he read a 
British report concerning the capabilities of the Gem V-2 rocket, and a NACA technical 
translatian of same ewller wo& pursued by l3@?n Singer. W i l l y  b y ' s  Rockets, the Future 
of Travel Eieycnd the Stratosphere (New York: V i k i n g  Wss, 19441, which treated the energy 
zlequirementv necessary for orbital fllght and escape l k m  the earth's gravltatlaal 
6 attractim, also stirmlated the young man. 
van Eraun paper, Havlland set about cmiderlng potential space mlsslons, and he spent 
several weeks exploring the technical f eas ib i l i t y  of earth satellites based upon exten-. 
sions of canventional V-2 rocket technologv. On August 10, 1945, he cartined the resul ts  
of this study in a rdne-page  men^ to  the Head of the BuAer Pficial Weapons Secticn, 
ret- that an earth satelllte project, "Project Rex," be authorized by the U.S. 
Nan. Althouejl mrloddrg the problenr, of atmospheric reentry, Haviland calculated that 
by clustering and staging large roacets, mmed ar t i f ic ia l  earth s3tell l tas were tectuii- 
cal ly  feasible, and he recarmended a mber of potential mlssions: as a platform for 
SLientiflc research, as camunlcations relay stations, and for use i n  mapping and met, poi-0- 
.I,h 
Aware of the discussions in the Aviation Design croup and, apparently, the 
logical sumreillance.7 
?he President's announcenrent af the existence of the atomic b a b  on A u g u s t  6- 
which suggested a pctential source of large 8'3unts of energy-enhanced Navy interest i n  
Havlland's proposal. It quickly won the support of N s  lnmdlate superior, Carrmander 
J. A. chantxm,' and fnm Captain ~ o y d  V. Berimer, himself destined to  play a significant 
role in Anrerlcan astronautics. Captain Berkner, Yead of the Electronics Materiel Branch, 
was rmch taken with the idea of a cantunlcations satelllk enployed as "an a r t i f i c i a l  
i c p l o ~ p h e r e , ~ ~  and he ccnvbced his superqm of the des i rab i l i ty  of invest@,tin% the 
pmspect of earth satell i tes. l* With authorization to  proceed, krimr discussed the 
matter with Carmander Harvey Hall," Special SclenZlflC Asoistant t c  the Head of the Radar 
Section. Hall agreed t o  assist In a c d t t e e  examination of the technical feasibll l ty of 
earth satellites. (3n October 3, 1945, Mer organized a Carmittee for Evaluating the 
Feasibility of Space Rocketry. 
THMRFTICAL VEXIFICATION OF A SINGTSSTAGE SA- ROCKET 
Between mld-August 1945, when the Haviland memo was brarght to  the attention of 
Berkner, and the creation of the satel l i te  camlttee on October 3, Harvey Hall determined 
that a t r u l v  nractlcal and useful earth satel l i te  cou:.d not be reallzed with existing 
V-2 propellants and '?chnology; a major advance in rocket technology, he reasoned, appeared 
necessary and desirable.12 Assipped at this :Ira? :o evaluate the appiication of jet pro- 
pulsion to  aircraft (which are "slngle-stage" vehicles), he also considered the avenues 
for admnoes In rocketry. Hall struck 9n the concept of a single-stage satel l i te  rocket. 
With the sa te l l i t e  c d t t e e  established, he successfully pressed thAO appro&ich among 
associates. 
materials and techniques and arrive at some estimate of the posslbility of attaining R 
velocity of libration frwn one stage of the 
of placing a single-stage space ship in orb:t above the earth warranted establlshlng a 
pm,jC3t within BuAer to  conduct a detailed study. 
vehicle that would canpensate for s t rucd ra l  deveiopnt  problems by ellmirating staglng 
and rei@tion of engines at upper altitudes, and that burned high specif'lc 3npdise 
liquid propellants such as hydrogen and oxygen, the m a n b e r s  suggested, would provide a 
more powerful as well as r e l i a b l e  satel l i te  rocket. 
mer for an Earth Satell i te Vehicle15 program, and functional-type project desks appeared 
in  variou sections as the satel l i te  studies 
were now more n m r w ,  arid influential: 
Design Eranch which handled BuAer guided missile projects, C a p t a i n  W. P. C o g s w ~ l l ~ ~  of 
the Mer Rad10 and Electrical Group, ard shortly therearb%r, Hear Adrmir?l Leslis Stevws, 
Assistant h i e f  for Research and Developrent, 3uAer. 
satel l i te ' s  usefulness f o r  ccmrnulications aid as a relay btation fo r  guidance of surface- 
to-swface missileb, nonetheless remained very duS:ous about obtaining the mrAq necesswy 
t o  build one In .lew of the congressional cuts i n  the post-war Naby budget already taking 
place.'' But most of the s u p p t e r s  were optimistic. Captain Fahmey created a special 
desk In the  Pilotless Aircraft Glvision "to handle 2'11 the engineering aspects of the 
Earth Satell i te Program," Etnd .-.electec L t .  C m c r  3. P. Haviland, TiSNR" tc naiuge it. 
Plans for t h i s  early Navy satellite project (not to be confbed wi th  the later 
V a n g c a r d  Program) called for three sequential pharzs leading to  eventual flight t e s h g :  
(1) the investigations aid preliminary research r ecmnded  by the sa te l i i t e  CCmnittee, 
(2)  a genersrl engineering study by one or mre contractors based upon the satisfactory 
capletion of the preliminary research, wd ( 3 )  award of a contract for construction and 
operation of a prototype vehicle.2" Subsequent Navy work incorporated the  sa te l l i t e  
canntttee premise of a single-stage satel l i te  rocket, and proceeded l a r g ~ l y  cn tLe 
strength of a hydrogen-oxs'gen rocket mtor  developrent program cwducted by t k  Aemjet 
Engineering Corpok6,10n,22 supervised by L t  . Camnder Robert Trvax. 
Aerojet personnel succeeded in burning gaseous hydrogen ani oxygen in a small wcket 
motor for the f i rs t  tim, and in  the following y e w  thry placed the largest hydrogen 
Accordingly, the camittee w a s  charged "to investigate presently available 
Cn October 29, 1945,14 the satel l i te  c d t t c e  concluded that the p o s s i b i l i t y  
A high mass-ratio, single-st&d 
BL. the end of Novemer 1945, considerable support had !15. n gene$?ated within 
me sa t e lu t e ' s  proponents 
Captain D. S. Fahrney, Head of the Special 
Stevens, tho@. he accepted the 
Ute i n  10' , 
+SIX 0. €I. Osboxn, R. Oorda?, 8nd H. L. caplen, with 0. S. James, "Liquid 
%- RoclQt Ehglne Developpent at Aemjet, 1944-1950," In tNs volune - Ed. 
2% 
Eh&r and JPGcal tech  adopted this ascent technique as a coc-elative axiam, and used it i n  
a-il subsequent engineering sturties for  the high altitude t e ~  ve.Ucle (HAW). 
3iLlce beccrae standard p m  in all space programs for COnfipratZng ascent trajectc- 
ries, for altering orbital  altitudes and eccentricity, and, with late:. modificatiws for 
s t 7 - d  vehicles, for 4 m v h g  payload capacity for a give? mass ratio.  lJnknwn t o  those 
tir work on the Navy satellite studies, the same innovation had been advanced rdny years 
beforr, by tfie Russian astmaautical pioneer K. E. 'Biolkovsky. 
t ion of )faner J. Stewart 3nd Frank 3. WLina. Us- the stipulatkns and scen t  tecMque 
suggested by the Navy, JPL calculations28 bixnflruk?d the technicil feasibil€ty of a sinple-  
stage liquid hydmgm-oqqgm satellite mket attalqlng a m i n i m u  circular em- I  orbit at 
240 Ian (150 miles) altitude provided: tfie fbel and e n g h  caabfnaticn would perfom 
according to theory, and that a projected propellant-@vss structure weight (mass) 
ratio of 0.885 to 0.895:l could actuilly be reallzed. A t  the same time, in a final 
report, JPL participants felt ObllpJ to resnind the Navy that "the requixwi prcpelhnt- 
gross wi&t ra t io  coula be gmatly reduced if a step mcket Es-1 wen? used. For 
exmple, a twr>-s'iep rocket would require, for each step, a pmpellant.gmss weight rat io  
of about 0.7."~' 
tract. to  Aemjet Engimerhg. EuAgr want& Aerqiet to detennim uhether a test stand 
value of the  s[ficific inpulse of liquid hydmgm-oxy&n was sufficiently near the theomt- 
i ca l  value to j u s t i o  the JPL conclusions of sate1li';e feasibility, perfm a desi@ 
study of a liquid hydrogen-oxygen rocket engine producing 136,000 kg ( ~ ~ , O O O  pounds) 
thrust ,  and fabricate a larger hydmgm-oxygen t e s t  engine rated at 454 kg (loo0 pounds) 
thrust.3' ~ h e s ?  pr0Pi;lsion system m t r a c t s  leri t o  the construction of uxt large hydrogen 
liquefier nenC,ic-xled. p~%!viously, and actual test stand operation of the liquid wdrogen- 
oxygen rocket engines that h d  canfirm theoretical performance  specification^.^^ Another 
engine with a 50 watt electrical  catput to power Satellite electronic equipment, and work 
ccrrx~~?llced Itl BuAer on the guidance and attitude contml bquipnent required for the period 
of \arpowered coast along an e l l ip t ica l  tvJectory prior to insertim in a circular orbit, 
mi for  orbit operaticns.2 verification of the structure mass ratio for the single- 
stage vehicle, the seccmd conditia? stipulated by .TPL, also began i n  mid-1946 as the Navy 
mved into the engimering deslfg phase of the earth satellite project. 
Meantirre, before m s t  of these early investigstlons had been carpleted, ~ ~ p p o r t  
for tk satel l l te  pmject was soLicited f r a n  many individuals and at  many levels i n  the 
Navy outside of EuAer. It soon became apparent that f U l  Navy support for an actual  
fUght test venicle pmg~'am-as Acbniral Stevem suspected-would be difficult  to achieve. 
In kvent3er 1945, costs for the engineering and preliminary desia p;me of the pmject 
It has 
JPL Corducted the* sttsdiw bet- Decenber 1945 July 1946 the direc- 
Ekamged by the Caltech work, rn July 1, lgJ+6, the Navy awruded a s e m ~  can- 
L K t l t r d C t  naS t0 North AIIEfiCatl h i l l & t S  (hpaQ? t0 des* a U&f3&.&t SOW 
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mced vith this vlpmsasing fiscal situation, lIE!l&m cf the Navy satellite 
camtttee approact& tk Anqr Air pbrces in the hope of establlsNrga joint earth satel- 
Ute project. A joint p j e c t ,  they believed, might be able to cuunmd fhamlal support 
sumcient far fught tests. Ihe pirst lB?etLzq3 betlJm%n mpr€ssmtives of tk b o  se- 
vices took place in uashi.t?@m, D.C. on IYarch 7,1946, in the OPFice of t k  Air mrce 
Wor cieneral H. X. MccleUand. Navy pe-1 pI*?sented the objectives an3 status of 
their mcket satellite pmject, Wther wlth a sugeested plan for the pmpo8cd Arnpr Air 
Forres-Navy experhmtal pmgran to evaluate, justify, and, if warmnted, awrrtruct and 
latachapmtotype vehicle. Flieceptionof ttre Navy pmposal by the Anuy .UrPbrces repm- 
Sentatiw seemed srorst faTfcmible; fbthentnm: 
It ra6 agrped at the cmference that the gemral advantages to be derived f h n  
pursuing the satellite development appear to be suf'f'icient to j u s t i Q  a -or 
cations in m l w s ,  may not 3ppea" at this cime to wammt the expendltum. 
&-a this basis, the Atmy representatives agreed to investlgpte the extent of 
Anqy interest by discussions w i t h  General 
joint anfemme is plat-mxt.35 
pmgmul, in spite of t k  fact that the obvious mblltaty, or purely naval appx- 
rtrd otkrers, after which a future 
For several days In March 1946 it appe- that a jmt- satellite m e c t  leading %o 
fli@-it ests might, possibly camrence in the Wtsd State;. 
Forces Chief of Staff ,  desigpated wor General Curtis E. IeEIay, recently qxmted 
Deputy Wef of Air Statf for ksearch arrd Develcpmt, to represt the Arnpr A i r  Pomes 
in ne@Aatiars wlth t& Navy satellite plpposal team. In ndd4arch. wle Gemral inforued 
a dismayed conmander Hall that the Army A i r  Rmes had decidednct to support the pm- 
posed joint  satell?te pmject, although k left open the possibll2ty of fmtkr discrrs- 
sions of earth  satellite^.^ Anrpr Air Forces rpplpsentatives confirmed the Spaatz-IaMay 
clecbion at a seccrxl meting in Us? Research and DevelcQlnent oomrdttee of the Aemnautical 
Board on April 9, 1946. X r  Rxce m e r  General Iaunence Craigle declared two 
separate proppm pmferabla to m . 3 7  w earth satellites were to  te ccxlstmcted, 
CraigLe inplied, the AT{ Air Forces intenrki to  be the service to  do it, especially 
since the 
space. 
satellite mckt hvestlgations with the g m q s  at JPL snd AemJet. Bmgh the encounter 
After Cammly r e v i a  the Navy PIOpasal, GerEral CaFl sp;ratz, Arnpr Air 
Air Fbrces had almady staked a claim to f u t e  military missions in arter 
38 
Personnel at the Navy wlreau of A e m t i c s  Iptunred to  their single-stw 
with the Amy Air Forces had been a disappointmnt, it had me positive ramificaticn. 
pmnpted another extensive sateUte study. 'Ihe 
oqpnlzaticn turned to  the Pmject RAMI n?sear& p p q ~  ard, as a first task, instructed 
th i s  mly farmEd cansultant a z a t i o n  to  perform a separate earth satellite f e a s i b i l i t y  
w i t h  repeated cklays WNle  the Air bree satellite study progessed. 
hvelqment Carmittee of the Aermautical Board. 
mi cc~posed of m- f ~ l  the ~nro r  a x i  h v y  air 
intervals to  mev'rew new developments and to  lpcancile "the viewpoints of the two services 
for tk nut& benefit of aviation."41 A t  this thM meeting A@' Ceneral craigle in- 
duced the Pmject RAM> satellite study "on which the ink was hardly dry, as the basis 
of a tar@ning positicn that the AAF was on an equal or similar develqment position 
w i t h  the Navy," Harvey H a l l  reflected. 
tmanis a joint pr>ject.m4* ht the meet-, attw convened for ti-e purpose of 
coardinating "tk inLtial phases of a CsateUtel pmject . . . and to define service 
-x!spcnsibillty, if desirable at this time," bespoke the serious cclltenporary internst in 
an &rtificlal earth satelllte: 
It 
Air Forces Research and Development 
A t t e n p t s  by the Navy Ekreau of kxmautics to arrange another cmferenw met 
cfi Mag 15 the mqective servlce representatives met again in the Research and 
W s  Board, fo& during World rJar I 
n0-u met at mthly 
"Fnm this point on, 110 fbrther progrwss was made 
a. It is the llpst prunising mans that has been suggested for providing guidance 
for guided .missiles and pilotless airwaft  at ranges in  excess cf about 
250 miles. 
It would p v i d e  mans for fheing warld-wide Camrrmications of periodic 
lack of r e l l a b i l i t y  attributed to cuter atapspheric effects. 
It rrdght be of nuch value in extending the understanding of meteorology, 
w i t h  cmsequmt inpmvemnt in meteomlogical predictions. 
It w o u l d  provide an initial step toward the event& construction of 
inhabited satellites and interplanetary travel, with far-reachi. 
lmpucatians. 
kcking agreemnt on whir% service should be responsible for actrraA developwnt 
b. 
c. 
d. 
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of prototype satellite vehlcles, however, the nrembers referred the question of jurisdic- 
tion back to the full Aercnautical Board for a decision. ?he Navy menixrs mintained 
steadfastly "that the mknowns involved in this project, and its inplications for the 
poss ib i l i t y  of space tmvel, mder premttuP any attenpts to  define Semrlce responsibil- 
i t y  at this t h e  . . . [but actual development of a satellite should] be undertaken 
jointly by the W ,  the Navy, and civilian science. 
because intercontinental warfare is of paramount interns;; to the Arqj A i r  FOrces, future 
plans involving actual carstruction of an earth satel l i te  should be under the  control of 
that orgar?!zation . . ."44 In the face of these service positions, the Research and 
Develcpmnt Ccmnittee could only mcarmend that tk A q q  A l r  Foi :es and the Navy continue 
Ihe Amy merrbers consider that 
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seprulate pxelimimry investigations. kantlm, the cawdttee established a fomnl 
subcamadttee on earth sateates to flrrther exmlxm its potential applications, ensure 
coordinatim, ami pzlevent d\pUcatlan of efYorts between the servlces. 45 
withollt agreenmt on joint mqmsib i l i t y ,  a well.Qfirred use far earth 
satellites, OF pFoject approval Avrn t k  Ae-ical bard, t k  Navy SateUte st* 
project by itself d d  not CQmPgd bFoad intemal support and the neoessary f\niing. 
Navy participants mu reallzed that ecnstructim and laan& of a plptotype satelllte- 
calctilated to ccet between $50 ami SlW udlllon--was at least tapmrUy pzwbxkd. 
~ r r t  fbrtkr -limbnary investigations* wem assured on May 8,1946, when the Chief of 
#a~d l  operations f- approved the w r  satellite YtW pmject,& ani the se~and 
phase of began: vehicle des-. In June ard July the Navy Bp?eau of 
Aennautics contracted for two mor stmctuml &sm studies, the first with North 
American Aviation, and the SeCQd with an old Navy stalwart, the Clem L. hr t in  
of Baltimule, Maryland. Both f3mm teaoled with Aemjet &@.mering Corpomticm on the 
engine ard -llants.47 
On Septenber 26, 1946, North American Aviation subadtted its report to BuAer. 
Ihe desi@ study, directed by U a m  A. Bollay, had been carried out in the fbmcs mly 
estabustred Aemphyslcs Laboratory. R. G. Milson served as Pmject Rgheer, with 
individual tectnical sections prepamd by L. A. Gore, msponsible for propellants, surface 
heating, and pwer plant; Bnnx, W. Augensteln, aemiynauics; R. C. W i l s a n ,  wei&t, 
balance, structural and gerrexal design; and R. G. Knutson, guidance and contml. Each of 
t k  contrlbutars based h i s  wark on tk Navy stipulated SLgle-stage satellite mcket 
bunling liquid hydmgm-oxygen, and the JPL specified mass ra t io  of 0.895:l mudmm. 
rJorth Araerican r e m  a pressure stabilized ogive structure 26 mters (86 feet) long 
a n i  with a maxinun diameter of 4.9 nreters (16 feet). "It is C C m S t N C t e d  of stmess 
steel and has nine clustexed hdivid&l thrust mo+~rs. The vehicle is capable of at- 
ina a maximm velocity of 6,820 meteis per secad (25,400 feet per s c a d )  at an altitude 
of about 225 Mlaneters (140 miles)"48 (Figure I). 
(101,400 l b s ) ,  bmken d m  into m-.jo~ carporrents: Propellants, 40,000 kg (89,OOO lbs); 
payload, 450 kg (1,OOO lbs); motor ad accessories, 2,250 kg (5,000 lbs); and structure, 
2,900 kg (6,400 lbs ) .  The starting weight required an initial thrust of 10S,700 kg 
(233,000 lbs) varying to about 139,700 kg (308,000 lbs)  thrust at; altitude.49 The fin 
recarmended an eventual longitudinal scaling of the vehicle to about 59,000 kg 
(130,000 lbs) p. 
configuatian, and an extension I n  the bunzlng time of the engines fnm 126 to  165 seconds. 
Ibm h f i c m  cksiw tte Altitude 'Pest Vehicle to 41,130 kg 
weight with no increase in the vehicle's maximum diameter In a final 
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Since the structures portion of t h i s  prcjected single-stafg? vehicle could not "rem mch 
more than flve percent of the total wewt of the  satellite mcket, the specifications 
called for a pmpellant-t+structure (mtent-tc+shell) r a t i o  appmaching that of an 
egg. ?his task, at once an englmer's aspiration and ni&tmwe, eventually 'csould be 
reauzed.50 
!he Clem L. Martin Conpany and Aemjet studies continued for a conplete fiscal 
year, ending ir June 1947. In its first pmgmss report, Martin proposed the use of a 
stardard honeycart, shell ronstruction if the stmngth requimmnts could be maintained 
within the mqxrat-?e ard pressure ranges encountered during flig&t into earth orbit.*l 
Under subsequent testing, engimers f d  this material inadequate t o  met  the necessary 
re-, and t.ky c?roppec? it in favor of the North American thin-sidn, stahless steel, 
pressure-stabilized "bbllnp" structural  scheme. Martin's extensive "'a report, w h i c h  
incarporated the Aemjet findings on a 136,000 kg (300,000 Ib)-thnst liquid hydrogen- 
oxyen engine, described a t r u l y  ienmkable single-stage satellite rocket errbodying 
virtually all of the sub;iJtem features presently found in separable booster rockets and 
spacecraft. This =port w a s  prepared by Pedro C. Wdha and W i l l i a m  B. Bergen, with 
support fran Charles H. Harry, who handled vehicle tempemtures and t d e c t o r i e s ,  and 
A l b e r t  J. Cevaud, respxisible fo r  devising the novel ascent @dance and ?ontml and 
orbi ta l  attitude control systems+ ( ~ i g u r e  2\. 
See E. E. Roberson, "Evolution of Spacecraft Attitude Contml Concepts Before + 
1952," in this VOlUme - Ed. 
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Mutin respomied to the bvy's requixemmts t o  see if a Larger, single-stage satellite 
rocket Muld be de\-. W i t h  t h  exception of the extensive work on the propulsion sub- 
system and saae electrunic clevices, these studies were not hardmre cmtmcts. Rather, 
they involved preliminary feas ib i l i ty  sad vehicle des- studies for the pur~ose of 
evaluating the upper limit to which a single-stage llquid t@ptp+oxyrzj?n Latellite rocket 
design could be carried. Ihe answers were positlve and encouraging: with appmprlate 
extension of rocket engine burning times and with SnaLL inprovements in metallurgy and 
electrcclics, a singlestage veMcle appemed deruni te~ feasible.'' 
W i t h  *& engineer- des- ccapleted i n  mid-1947, the BuAer satelllte studies 
had pmgressed about as far as they could possibly go on paper. ?he prospect of a hiatus, 
or muse--ccnplete cessatlon--of the work, caused individuals associated with the Navy 
proposal to seek agah authorization of third phase hardware development and ccns:mction 
of a pmtotype vehicle. 8ut the mnewd search for institutional support would be made 
all tire m m  difficult by the unresolved questions of satellite ut i l i ty ,  the continued 
intexwst of the Anqy Air Forces in a separate satellite project of its om, and by the 
post=- Iwulganization of the BRoed services. 
Ch January 24, 1947, Rear Achirdl kslle Stevens, Assistant Chlef for Research 
awi Developent, BuAer, sent a letter to the Joint Research and Lkvelopment Board (JRDB). 
coordination of interservice requiremnts for earth satellites, he declaml, w a s  "beyod 
the scope of action" of the kmnautical  Board, particularly when one considered the 
satellite held mat potential for extending basic knowledge thmugh cooperation w i t h  
university scientists, Admiral Stevens continued, and he praposed that "the Joint Research 
and Develcpnrent Board establlsh an agency for the coordination, evaluation, justification, 
and allocation of all phases of the Earth Satellite Vehicle program . . ." by mans of 
a new ad hoc JRDB panel carposed of civilian scientists as w e l l  as mili tary 
representatives. 
proposdl under advisemat. Shortly thereafter, upon nquest of the A q r  Air Forces and 
in  keeping with militnry canity extended in such situations, it was IwTlFinded t o  the 
Aeronautical Borud for revlew before f lnal  action. Meantlnk?, however, the American 
mili tary services underwent the most profound reorganization In their collective history. 
(.h July 26, 1947, President Trurmn simed the National Mil i tary Act. A National Mil i tary 
Establishment, under a Secretary of Defense, replaced the historic Departmnts of War 
and N w y ,  and the m, Navy and Air Force received equal service status. ?he Act also 
replaced the JRDB with a Research and Development Board (RDB) . 
possibility of nutudl cooperation between civillan scientific and mili tary pvups. 55 The 
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?he W a r  Department's Joint Research and Developnent Bosrd took A c h r d r d l  Steven's 
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Speaking for  the Aeronautical Ebard a few weeks before the Mllitary reorganiza- 
tion, Air Poroe Lieutenant General b y t  S. Vandenberg  and Navy Vice Admiral D. B. hncan 
inforared the JRae that, mtwithstaniing Admiral Steven's cmtentims ccncemlng the 
interests of civilian scientists, the Aeronautical Board mimined carpetent to decide 
matters of earth satellites. The JNB, they said, would be apprised of any decisions 
58 made m the satelllte pmgram. 
suspended in both g o v e m n t a l  bureaus: i n  the satellite s u b c d t t e e  of the Research 
grcup, p-ss on the A i r  mrce and Navy satellite pmgram was reported and discussed, 
and other pmposals on the disposition of responsibility for  earth satellites considered. 
For exanple, late i n  the year the satelllte subcamittee of the Aem Board "noted with 
interest" a secord Navy proposal that offered the Office of Naval Research as a potential 
satellite coard ina tu  agency in the view of the scientific aspects of the pmgram. The 
sutmmittee r e f e m  the issue to the flill R&D Cannittee of the  em ~oard nfor action.n59 
obviously transcended mil i tary interests alane, the RaB likewise smght to decide where 
to place g o v e m n t  responsibili',y for coordinating earth satellite activity.60 A t  its 
in i t ia l  meeting a Decenber 19, 1947, the reconstituted Research ard Developnent FKmxi 
ackhssed this question and the Aeronautical Board's June response. lhough the m e r s  
judged a separate ad hoc coordinating carmittee originally urged by Achniral  Stevens 
unnecessary,61 they remved responsibility for satelllte developnents fmm the Aeronauti- 
cal Board and vested it i n  the flDB Camittee on Guided Missiles.62 ?he Guided Missile 
Cannittee, i n  turn, assigned an evaluation of all the satellite work to  me of its sub- 
?he Camdttee instructed this civilian-staffed 
!kchnical Evdluation Group, chaired by Walter A. 
the des i rab i l i ty  of such a [satellite] pm@am, whether a single jointly supported pro- 
gram or separate ccnpetitive developnents should be sponsored, and an estimate of the 
tjm scales and expenditures nqul red for capletion of the reccmnended program. . . .'I 
by the end of March 1 9 4 8 . ~ ~  With the log-jam over a coordinating agency broken at last, 
the way appeared open for ksearch and Developnent Board wproval of cmtinued Navy 
satelllte work-or perhaps a joint pmgram, i f  not with the Air Force, then possibly with 
On March 29, 1948, the Technical Evaluation Group reported on Its evaluation of 
Thus, throughout the latter hXE of 1947 the subject of earth satellites remained 
and Developnrent Carmittee of the Aercxlautical Board, and in the JRD&RDB. In the first 
Since the inplications for basic scientific research i n  outer space rather 
panels, the Technical m u a t i o n  Group. 
to provide an "opinlon as to 
scirntific grwps. 
the Navy and Air Force satel l i te  programs. 
held the technical fe<%lbility of building an earth satellitf: vehicle t o  be clearly estab- 
lished; however, neither the Navy nor the Alr Force, the merbers declared, had as y e t  
offered a military or scientific u t i l i ty  camrensurate with the expected cost of such a 
vehicle. 
In  a three-point opinion, the civilian p u p  
Consequently, the grcup recarmended that at present, a s a t e l u t e  not be 
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canstructed. Because severe developnent problems could be anticipated i n  building a 
singlestage satellite rocket, the group Wher recomnended that studies of the u t i l i t y  
of earth satellites be the only serious activity t o  continue at Project RAND. Though 
the p c u p  encouraged the Navy t o  participate with the A l r  Force in the RAND studies and 
pursue United developmnt of' liquid k-@rogen-oxygen engines and lightweight tanks and 
structures,65 the findine;; C l e a r l y  spelled a deferral of satellite work in general, and, 
in particular, an end t o  the Navy's single-stage satellite rocket. 
desperate a t t q t  t o  continue the Navy satellite program in rodifled form. This die-hard 
group of space scient is ts  now urged c m t r u c t i c n  of l iquid hydmaen-oxygen "Interim %st 
Vehicle, Mo7," reconfigured t o  a super performance sounding rocket that would rise t o  an 
altitude of 320-640 km (200-to-400 miles) (F igw 3) .  to 
an ad h q  subcamittee of the Nationdl Advisory Cornnittee for Aeronautics (NACA) that 
had been recently established t o  explon? and organize mthods f o r  extending the tables of 
the s t a n d a ~ I  atrmsphere at altitudes above 6,100 mters (20,000 feet).67 If approved 
and b u i l t ,  the Navy satellite proponents hoped the sounding mcket m€&t r a l ly  eventual 
financial support for the canstructicm and launch of an earth satellite vehicle. 
A mnth later i n  April, Harvey Hall and his associates in Wer nrade a las t  
They submitted th is  
fig. 3 
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In addition t o  the NACA Subcamittee on the Upper Atrosphere, Navy proponents 
also sought formal acceptance and endorsemnt of the new rocket fmn the RDB's Geophysical 
Sciences Comnittee. By this t b ,  however, the BuAer proposal confronted severe obsta- 
cles-not only i n  the form of the Technical Evaluation Group flLndineS of the prevlous 
mnth, but in direct canpetition frwn a c-on at m: the Office 3f Naval Research 
had alwady received Navy approval to  construct and launch a soulding rocket for upper 
amsphere research.68 According t o  Hall, the response t o  this penultimate proposal ended 
all Navy satel l i te  studies at this tim. The RDB Geophysical Sciences Camnittee took no 
action whatever; the NACA Subcornnittee on the Gpper Atmosphere favorably endorsed the 
project but had no h d s  t o  c d t  t o  the work. Whatever interest in earth satelutes 
that existed at Wier  camand levels i n  the Navy had now al l  but disappeared. 
year 1949, the Navy Bureau of Aeronautics began transferring the mmining funds eanrarked 
for satel l i tes  to other projects of mre  irmrediate interest. 
texminated for al l  practical purposes on June 22, 1948, when the Pilotless Aircraft 
DiviLion notified Admiral Stevens that "the Earth Satell i te Project has been discontinued 
as such and work is now proceeding with emphasis on the developlnent of a liquid-oxygen, 
liquid-hyyhogen rocket engixe. When this power plant appears feasible, flight tes t  
vehicles W i l l  be designed and c o n ~ t r u c t e d . " ~ ~  
one mre yea r ,  but  suffered frcm technical problems associated WLth e-ne heat exch- u- 
and chanber cooling processes. That effort concluded in 1949,71 ringing dawn the - .  ?I,=.!. 
on Navy satel l i te  efforts i n  the 1940s. The total  cost t o  the Navy of a l l  satelute- 
related work conducted between 1945 and 1949 has been estimated at approximately $1.5 mil- 
110n.~* Ironicaliy, when the satel l i te  program expired jn the BuAer Pilotless Aircraft 
Division, the Navy reprogranmd the re- flmds (around $170,000) to the Office of 
Naval Research for development of the V i k i n g  sounding rocket, also under contract at the 
Glenn L. Wctin C ~ r n p a n y . ~ ~  In the, V i k i n g  becam the first stage booster for Americats + International Geophysical Year satel l i te  i n  the mld-1950s. 
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In March 1948, i n  response t o  a Presidential ceiling on expendltws for fiscal 
'ihe Navy satel l i te  effort 
A t  Aerojet, work on this last remabl~g satel l i te  component did continue for 
CONCLUSION 
"he earth sa te l l i t e  studies undertaken by the Navy wuleau of Aeronautics in the 
late phases of World War I1 responded to (1) rapid w a r t i m e  advances in rocket tectnology 
at home and abroad, (2)  an encounter between mrrbers of an Allled technical Intelligence 
team and German rocket specialists from the Peenemde rocket base, and ( 3 )  accounts of 
the V-2 ballistic missile and its potential applications published i n  open literature 
See M. W. Rosen, "The Viking Rocket: A Memoir," in tNs volme - Ed. i 
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and in cantenpomy Intelligence reports. These Investlgatians took place before the 
invention of the transistor, the development of solid-state c i r ~ u l t r y , ~ '  and the spread 
01' Wtal mputers; they we= canpllcated fbrther by questions of satellite ut i l i ty ,  
ndlitary jurisdiction, the technical difficult ies involved in a single..stage, hydrogen- 
oxy- sateliite rocket, ard the projected costs and ec0Cb;yRles of the mitent. 
reasonable to assum that one or a cm&Lnatim of all these conditions wwld have deterred 
secure Navy support outside -&r, added to these .factors , preflgured the denouement. 
a pmtotype hydxqpn-oxygen sin&?-stage satellite vehicle was ,  ultimtely, kar Admlral 
Stevens' t o  mke. 'Ib Admiral, a r a n  of st.- convictims, surmised that a third-phase 
hmbrare p m p m  in 1947-1948 wcula Involve a technical undertaking of colossal propor- 
ti-, with Uttle pmpect  for any eLarly M x r n  on the hvestnrent. Without broad lnter- 
nal Interest or 2oInt semrice sponscmhlp 3 r  a satellite program, he elected not to 
proceed.76 If keen enthusiasm remabed evident throughout this period amng Individuals 
in I t s  research bureaus, Influential mrs of the operating arm of the Navy mmlned 
gpnerally unaware o f - o r  at least not mch taken with-these studies or the satellite's 
potential applications.77 'Ib demise of Navy-BuAer satellite stulieu In the late 1940s 
appear to  devolve fmm these two Interrelated causes: 
(which is mrmally reflected in priorit ies),  ani ccntenporary exigencies associated With 
tectwslogv, c a t ,  and veldcle ut'Uty. 
(h the other hand, the Air Rme-a relatively new service prinlarily ccncemed 
with fli&t in end beyond the atmsphere-mvecl actively into satellite research. Prompted 
by the Navy work, the Air Force soon issued orders for  active lnstituticrnal support of 
an earth satellite program at the hiefiest lcvels of c a ~ m a n d . . ~ ~  This Interest was sus- 
tained, w a i t e d  on or advanced the required technology, and culrr;ln.ted in the Thor-Agma 
and Atlas-@m satellite fl ights that began eleven years later, m 1959. 
'Ihough the aspirations of Haviland, Hall, and their Navy colleagues would not 
be fwfilled as rapidly as they wished, an historic milestone had passed for astronautics 
in the late 1940s. 'he tec!!cal feasibility Df space fli&t--as opposed to the theoret- 
ical f eas lb i l l t y  of this activity developed by Qoddard, Tsiolkovsky, Oberth and others 
d m h g  the early years of this century-had been finnly established and officially 
ac~m-.79 -stions asiced and answered i i l d  no longer rem focused on astro- 
nautical theory,8o but on practicalities of when and how, and on satelllte u t i l i t y .  
Answers to  these questlaw would c m  in the decade t o  follcw. 
It is 
endeavor in the years that im?dIately followed. ?he participant's i nab i l i t y  co 
75 
Before March 1948, a Navy decisjm t o  proceed t o  thlrd-phase constluction of 
reserved institutional S U ~ ~ O A %  
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!he Ruwlor is indebted t o  a nu rb r  of individuals who took time t o  read and 
critique early dra f ts  of t h i s  work, or who kindly assisted in  the task of research. Most 
especially he is indebted to those whose assistance made t h i s  paper possible: 
Robert P. Haviland and W e y  Hal l ;  Myra Grenier, Corporate Librarian, Aerojet Gene1 %I 
Corporation; Eugene M. Pme, NASA Historian; k e  M. Pearson, Historian, Naval A i r  System 
camnend; D. C. Allami, Operatimil Archives Branch, Office of the Chief of Naval Cpera- 
tions; Max Rosenberg, Deputy Chief rlistorian, O f f i c e  of the A i r  Force Chief of Staff; 
R. A. Wlrnaker, Historian, Office of the Secretary of Defense; and Herman G. Goldbeck 
and Thomas E. Hohmnn of the General ServLces AcBninistmtion, National Archives and 
Records Service. 
I. Military ranks were assigned civilians functioning lrl mil i ta rJ  zones. ~ s a i o n e d  
an Anqy Lieutenant, Dr. Hsue-shen 'I'sien was a protege of Theodore ;fori Kdmh at the 
California Institute of Techr,ology aid,  as a student, a member of the G U I T  Rocket 
Research Project during 1937-1939. 
January 22, 1970. !bile not present at this meeting Watt  related that 'Men informed 
him of the pro(x&irgs during subsequent discussions. Von Braun's paper was published 
i n  F. Z w i c k y ,  Repozt on Certain Phases of War Research i n  G e m ,  Vol. 1, Aerojet 
Engineering Corporation, October 1, 1445, 66-12; republished by the Air Materiel C m m n d ,  
Wright Field, Dayton, M o ,  in January 1947. 
2. Events as reconstructed in a telephone interview, Abraham Hyatt with the author, 
3. Cf . ,  H e m  Oberth, Die Iiakete zu den Planetenraumec, Verlag von R. Oldenbourg, 
Mrdch and Berlin, 1923, NASA 'IT F-9227, pp. 94-96; and H. Noordung, Das Problem der 
a report prepared for the AAI 3cientific Aiivisory Group, August 1945, 
1946 by Headquarters, Air Materiel camnand1 13; also, 'Tie Statlon i n  
des Weltraum, Berm, 1929; on German wartime planning, see Theodore vcn KdhMh, 
h e , ' '  Jour& of the Anrerkn h c k t  Society, #63, September 1945; 8; and Zwicky, loc. _. a. 
4. matt Intervlew, &. $2. 
5. Haviland, wha dentxistrated a ywt .h fu l  interest i n  olectrordcs, gmduated fmn the 
(R. P. Haviland, "Personal Profile,tt 
Missouri School of Mines in electrical engineering i n  the late 1930s together with a 
fellow classmate in the same field, Gear@.? Wller, who would la ter  serve as NASA 
Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight. 
J m l  of Space FLI t, March, 1970, 106 ff. 1, Capt. W. P. Cogswell, an azsoclate at 
"More than once fiaviland $old m: 
-tab W. P. COgSWelA, USN (Ret.) to the author, February 9, 1970.) 
cited at note : . lkch la ter  Hav'land recalled that he had u o  seen a le t ter  to the 
editor f'rorr, RAF radarnm Arthur L. Clarke which appeared in  tke Brit ish journal Wirel-.ss 
w. 
upper atmsphere as rocket sorx'cs, and (2), with upper stages, placing uryrranned satel l i tes  
-r, r e d k d  the fk- Putenant's urmsfmhed enthusiasm for astronautics years later: 
' C a p t a i n ,  you'vc 6gt to  get spacemed!" '  (Letter, 
6, The rzterial reviewed tg Aavtland at this time is refermced in h i s  j a te l l i t e  mem 
The Clarke le t te r  proposed the pstwar use of V-2 rockets for (1) exploring the 
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in orkX about the earth to  c d u c t  scienfiflc e x p e r h n t s  and t o  act  as currruniaatim 
relay statio&. If accurate, thls letter and the work by Wllly I r y  appa-xntu start- 
Haviland thinking seriously -ut astronautics several mnths earlier. Dlephone inter- 
view with Robem; P. %viland, January 28 and June 19, 1969. (See also, Clarke, V-2 for 
Ionosphere Research?" i n  Letters t o  Editor, Wireless World, Febrwy 1945, p. 58.) 
Section, Elect. Materiel Branch, Subjedt.: 
Rockets, A u g u s t  17, 1945, 8. Knowledge of the contenporary German suggstions is !ndl- 
cated when he 'I. . . noted that the German cornnand was actually glanninl; such a [satellite] 
progam with tbe added feature of an l q r a c t l c a l  'Sun Gun. 'I1 
navigatian and ccmreulicatim system on hI@ frequencies, and free f k m  norizon ZMta- 
tions and sky-wave errcrs." Mem, AerG--315JAC, F41 (11, Rwn Head, SpeciS Weapons 
Section, bo Head, ExperMnts and Dewloptsnts Branch, Subject: "First Ehc .semt.* on 
Baccn Desk . . . Mem AewG3U-RPH 9'41 (1) Written 10 August 1945,'' A u g u s t  25, ~ j 4 5 .  
to the ionosphere as an area of research in 1937; sateliltes no doubt appeared it3 a 
practical meam t o  extended Investigations in thls reglon. 
w a s  lnstnanental In the creation of the U.S. IGY batelllte program. Years later !-e 
intlmated t h a c  a still ePrlier satelllte technology survey may have been conducted at 
WlAer: "Ixlring the war 01~:. early studies in  the havy shaed the orbiting Earth satelllte 
w a s  within the range of ~'2 technoloaJ. But in- it was clear that  space technalogy, 
aside f'ran short-- rockets, would iiot be a factor i n  that wm, so the mtter w a s  laid 
aside. . . ." ( I ta l ics  added. Llovd V. Berkner 'Science. the Scientist and S~ace ."  
7. Ikno AeercE;r313RPH, F.41 (11, fI.an R. P. Havlland, Beacon Desk, I ~ e n t i f i c a t i o n  
Comnents Concerning Use and Dwel+rL.nt of 
8. Chmbers ape,;; that "space-ships, as ~.?oposed [by Havllandl will afforu! a world-wide 
9. Letter, Captain W. P. Cogswell, loc. c i t .  Dr. Berkrer apparently was first ettracted 
In the early 1950s Dr. Berktxr 
of the Conference-on &ace Science ad Space hw, June 18,-1963, &. b i  
D. Schwart z. I* J ersw: Fred B . Rotlmwr & GO.. m4. 1.) Dr. Harvey Hall. 
sc-1-ence advisor t o  5. Ekrkner between 1941 and 1944 has-indicated, however, that these 
earller w a r t h e  studies ccncerned rockets, not satellites. 
author, Decenter 4, 1969. 
10. D, S. pahrney,'?he History of Pilotless Aircraft and Guided M,Issiles,"BuAer, 1958, 
unpublished, p. 1132. 
11. Dr. Hal, a theoretical physicist, Lad ju;t returned f'ran an assignment with the 
U.S. Naval Technical ~ s s i c n  in EUrope during krgust 1945, a m 4  had been persuacied t o  
Irqnain in the Navy by Rear Admlral ksl ie  Steven;- t o  assist in  evaluating the ,?uture of 
j e t  propulsion prlmwlly with respect. io  its potential value for naial aviation. Admiral 
Stevens waa concerned that with the sbarply reduced bQdget, tne N a v j  ml@t "find itself 
brepmably frozen in an absolute pattern in a\Iation." (Hall letter, Decen$er 4 ,  1969, -- loc. cit.) iJhi1.~ Lt .  E%tbert Haviland provided the initial spark set t ing eanth satellite 
events in mtlon, Dr. Harvey Hal!,, the theoretician, largely deternined the te*hnolo@cal 
course these events were t o  take at BuAer i n  succeciding nnnths. 
12. :'Not tkt orbitlng payloads wa8 impossible witllout I t  Lthc advmce'l, but +.:e x d k e t s  
would be large, c-lex, expensive, with m a l l  payloads, ard t' ? missic E that had been 
pmpxed . . . hardly appeared t o  j u s t i fy  the ef?ort." Harvey Hall, letter of Decmber 4 ,  
1969, &. e. 
13. Muno, AerG3-203-KW4, f'ran Captain R. S. Hatcher, Ijeputy V a c t o r  of &g.ineering, 
Erperiments and Developments, t o  Distribution, Subject: Establishrent of a Camnittee f u  
Evaluating the Feas lb iUty  of Space Rocketry, October 3, 1945. 
Letter. W e y  Hall t o  the 
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scale engine was ccas>let.ai+%d mier an 
m e t  to develop ami febricate a -ci-- mcicet errgLrre of 2 , m  to 
3,000 pow% mt, essentially a smaU scale eqxrimental mpDdel of the anticipated, 
final versim. 
3. See D. A. Young, Fmgtess Report, AeroJet k 7 i ,  Jarrr;uy 1947, Noa(s)8496; and, 
Ebbert Gomian, IrJvrl Report on 300,OOO F t n d  Thrust Liquid Roclaet Power Plm:, Aemjet 
speclrrc fnpulse m m  
to the same mtmct--aiAer aUth0ris;ed 
k74, ?#arch l947; also, tive 0 t tkns i ty  and 
32. The power d t ,  w i t h  an estimated ue-t of &out 13 papds, was to enploy 
as a -nreditmand use a llquld such ad methanol as a kat exctmger. See 
Harvey Hell, *Early Histary and Baclrgrand on Earth satellites," m IIpm3, m:a:m:f3r, 
No- 29, 1957, 3; ard, letter fmn L. M. Fkarscn, AIRO6B:UlP, December 30, 1969. 
tlau indicates that mass ratio carstralnts avomi a "mall but lrsehil-m output of 
abaut 30 watts . . . Cover3 a highs pcner but heavier nuchar energy ar nuclear isotope 
power source," uhlch would mquhe a m r e  extensive ckvelopmt period. 
33. W r  #nr, -3lT-W, CX-281360, No-r 2?, 1945, cited In Han=y Hall memo, 
34. As me observer mall&: "After V J  day . . . scientists, as at tk Mat i an  Lab. 
could not be intemsted In guided missile projects (of which tk canarplicatians satellite 
[Fsvl was only are) ard wanted only t o  wind up their affairs and go back t o  their foxmer 
pursuits, or better. Likewise the Puler a3nIm.L ' were menchanted by eplided missile 
projects-as c m  rer;arked: (Letter, Capt. 
W. P. -11, &. 9.); and, Qlbion and Cormry point out that "Fiscal 1946, dram 
up in  anticipation of a huge hva. lrxl of Japan, qui% began to  be whittled away before 
it could be spent. Altoether, ' than $20 billion of Navy fLuds were cut back." 
Flscal 1947 was finally appmved ' d  $4.1 bi1l .m (as opposed to a Navy request for 
$6.3 b i l l i d  and fiscal 1948 and 1949 f o l l d  at $3.6 and $3.7 b i l l l a ;  restxctivelv. 
'1Early History and Ba&@mMl m Earth satellites," &. tit. 
'We want equiprent that we know worJcs ln 
See-R. 0 .  Albion and R. H.-CoMery,-&s_tal and tt; Havy (& York: Col&ia Univ;?rsity 
Press, 1962) 154. 
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37. BAer m e m ~  &PA-52 W1(1), to Joint Research ard Dewlaprrent Board, J m  24, 
1947, 3. e., p. 2. 
40. Fb& of the k- fk~earch and DeW1-t conmitts dt this  IRE 
EWigadler Ge~ra l  Iawence C. w e ,  
Adrrdrdl Leslie C. Stevens, U.S.N., chairnran; and Cap tah  R. S. Hatcher, U.S.N. Also 
pe.jent at Research and Developrrent meetings were additimal invited persomel. 
41. 
Chief of Laval Uperaticas (Air), History Unit, GPO, 19471, 1. Later, in June 1946, this 
~ z a t i m  was partially supplanted by the Joint Research and Develqmnt Board [JRLB] 
of the War Department chaired by V a n n e v a r  wtsh, which expanded and foxmallzed many of the 
hc t icns  perfonred by the Aemnautiwl W over a wider spectnm of activit ies.  ('lhe 
Aeronautical Fbard passed away carpletely i n  1948.) 
of research and developnent, in  the light of WNch individual projects of the Axmy, Navy, 
and A i r  Force could be evaluated. The Board decided who developed what we-. It made 
sure that there was no unnecessary duplication in the act ivi t ies  of the  service- 2lttmffh 
it could permit canpetition WNch p d s e d  t o  produce better results. JRDB +rr :an wds 
Air Fbrces, Colmel  H. 0. aurker, A. C.; Rcar 
M a n  0. Van wen, The Aemnauticdl Boiud, 1916-1947 (Washington, D.C.: Deputy 
T5K chief tpsponsibility of the JRDB involved preparation of an integmted progmn 
27 3 
48. 0. Ullsan, Stmctuml DeSm StW, High Altitude Mt Vehicle, Cantract N)a(s) 8349, 
North Aplerictn A v i a t i o n ,  Inc., Report No. NA 46-756 , at- 26, 1946, p. 1-1. 
51. C. Medina, ss Report No. 1, &bit Roject &.tiact -(SI 8376, The 
G m  L. Martin Ccaparur, &port &=, septembe 15, 19 46, P. 5 .  
52. F w m C . M e d i n a , € i 4 T L s W m r a r y ~  rt, Contmct Noa(s) 8376, ?he Glem L. W L i n  
Canpengr, Report No. 2-A and B. 
53. R. GoM, D. A. Ycnmg, 0. Bosco, and A. Pelton, Flnal Report on a 3OO,OOO Paund 
'Duust Liquid Rocket Fwer Plant, Contract NOa(s) 8496, AemJet Ehglneer.ing Corporation, 
k p o r t  No. .%74, l4wcl-1 31, m, pp. 2 and 4. 
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54. In addition to the foIpgDlng des* studies, the Navy also fowxi txzmnIm%icn of this 
concept in two mre limited separate studies, the flrst&z@ Illentiured, AaR Report 
No. 4&pmpami by the WlAer Avlatian De- &search croup uder tfie technical dirpctlon 
of I. H. DrQgs, an3 the SeCQd by W. F. BaLlhaus at the Dougles Aircraft Ccmparur. 
Letter, 0. E. Lancaster t o  the author, February 6, 1970; and W. F. Ballhaus, Rp 
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